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FOREWORD
If RMA (revolution in military affairs) was the
acronym and concept of choice in the U.S. defense
community in the 1990s, so preemption has threatened
to supercede it in the 2000s. The trouble is that officials
and many analysts have confused preemption, which
is not controversial, with prevention, which is.
In this monograph, Dr. Colin S. Gray draws a sharp
distinction between preemption and prevention, and
explains that the political, military, moral, and strategic
arguments have really all been about the latter, not
the former. Dr. Gray provides definitions, reviews the
history of the preventive war option, and considers
the merit, or lack thereof, in the principal charges laid
against the concept when it is proclaimed to be policy.
Dr. Gray concludes that there is a place for preventive
war in U.S. strategy, but that it is an option that should
be exercised only very occasionally. However, there
are times when only force seems likely to resolve a
maturing danger.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute
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SUMMARY
Preemption has been, and remains, a leading
concept of this decade. But despite its ubiquity in
public discourse and its policy relevance, it is a source
of great confusion. The term is misused, in some cases
deliberately one suspects, but it must be admitted that
strategic theorists have offered very little worthwhile
reading on the subject. This monograph clarifies the
meaning of preemption and distinguishes it from
prevention and precaution. It critically reviews the
principal charges levelled against preventive warfare
and uses that analysis to provide at least the bare bones
of strategic theory, more strictly of an alternative to
theory relevant to such warfare. The analysis concludes
with a set of policy and strategy relevant implications
for the United States.
Preemption is not controversial; legally, morally,
or strategically. To preempt means to strike first (or
attempt to do so) in the face of an attack that is either
already underway or is very credibly imminent. The
decision for war has been taken by the enemy. The
victim or target state can try to disrupt the unfolding
assault, or may elect to receive the attack before
reacting. In truth, military preemption will not always
be feasible.
By way of the sharpest contrast, a preventive war is
a war of discretion. It differs from preemptive war both
in its timing and in its motivation. The preemptor has no
choice other than to strike back rapidly; it will probably
be too late even to surrender. The preventor, however,
chooses to wage war, at least to launch military action,
because of its fears for the future should it fail to act
now. In other words, the preventor strikes in order to


prevent a predicted enemy from changing the balance
of power or otherwise behaving in a manner that the
preventor would judge to be intolerable. Naturally, the
more distant the anticipated menace, the greater the
degree of guesswork as to the severity and timing of
the danger. A precautionary war is one waged not out
of strong conviction that a dangerous threat is brewing
in the target state, but rather because it is suspected that
such a threat might one day emerge, and it is better to
be safe than sorry.
Put in the vernacular, preventive war, the real subject
of this monograph, refers to the option of shooting on
suspicion. In an age of weapons of mass destruction
(WMD), it could be too late to shoot if one waits for
suspicion to be verified by hostile behavior. The official
American attitude toward preemption has fluctuated
between the admirable declarations of principle by two
of its outstanding lawyers: Daniel Webster in 1842 and
Elihu Root in 1914. Webster insisted that preemptive
action is justified only in the event of a threat that is
so imminent that there is no time for other measures.
Root took the far more expansive and flexible view that
preemptive action must be permitted on a timeline that
allows the victim state to take precautions. In effect,
Root amended Webster by claiming the legality of a
decision to wage preventive war in order to forestall
the maturation of the menace. This is not preemption,
it is prevention.
Contrary to the impression one might derive from
the scale and intensity of the legal debate, it happens to
be the case that there really is no legal issue about this
subject. International law, in the form of the United
Nations Charter, recognizes the inherent right of selfdefense by states, and it does not oblige a victim state
to wait passively to be struck by an aggressor, although
vi

it appears to do so—it is a matter of interpretation. In
short, preventive action by way of anticipatory selfdefense is legal, or legal enough. Understandably, this
permissive interpretation of the license granted by the
right of self-defense is open to criticism. In effect, it
means that there is no legal constraint on a state’s right
to resort to force.
The author explains that prevention has not only
been a common motive for war, actually it has been
quite routine. It is difficult to find historical cases of
warfare wherein prevention was not a motivator.
Wars typically occur for several, even many, reasons.
Prevention is nearly always prominent in the cluster
of those reasons. The concept of preventive war has an
ominous ring to it that is not entirely deserved. Poor
historical understanding is the explanation.
In this monograph, the major criticisms and issues
bearing upon preventive war are presented, and their
merits and demerits are highlighted. Preventive war is
charged with being an act of aggression that is illegal
and immoral. We find no value in this accusation, at
least as a generality. Preventive war is claimed to be
feasible only if intelligence is immaculate. Again, we
are unimpressed. It is the view of the author that, with
a few exceptions, intelligence needs only to be “good
enough.” To demand perfect knowledge is to prohibit
preventive action. The charge that prevention is seen by
some people as a panacea, a “silver bullet,” is found to
have merit. Next, the claim that preventive warfare must
be considered in a framework of probable and possible
costs, as well as expected benefits, is approved strongly;
it is all too easy to allow one’s wishes to suppress
suggestions of negative possibilities. Preventive war
is charged with prejudging the failure of other policy
instruments. This is true, but not conclusively so.
vii

Very often, arguments for more time for diplomacy,
sanctions, political subversion, and so forth, are really
efforts intended to stall a move to military action, rather
than serious claims for prospective success. We need
to beware of excuses for endless delay regarding the
military option. It is claimed that preventive action sets
a most undesirable, even dangerous precedent. This
may be true, though it is almost certainly exaggerated,
since states scarcely need foreign examples to license
muscular self-defensive behavior. To the degree to
which it is true, one has to respond by acknowledging
the probable fact, while not allowing it to serve as a
veto on action we deem essential. Finally, it is fairly
popular to argue that a policy that favors prevention
represents a futile quest for absolute security. This is a
very weak argument. To be willing to act preventively
need not be an expression of a foolish search for total
security. The argument depends upon a glaring non
sequitor.
The monograph offers some thoughts and
suggestions with respect to prevention and strategic
theory. It observes that there is extant no theory of
preventive war. Two reasons for this are postulated.
First, the concept is political, and therefore escaped the
attention of the rational choice analysts who constructed
their narrowly military strategic theory in the 1950s
and 1960s. Second, preventive war is not a concept akin
to deterrence and containment, despite the suggestion
to the contrary made by President George W. Bush.
Preventive action is regarded in this monograph
as an option that very occasionally is necessary. It
does not have the character of a reasonably reliable
default strategy, as do deterrence and containment.
The following are the principal observations and
suggestions for improving theoretical understanding
of preventive war:
viii

1. Preventive war is simply war, distinguished only
by its timing.
2. Since preventive war is simply war, it is already
explained adequately by Clausewitz.
3. Preventive war, in common with all war, is a
gamble.
4. The “preventor” begins with the advantage of
the initiative, but if success is not achieved swiftly and
decisively, that advantage will rapidly diminish as the
enemy recovers and counterattacks.
5. The assessment of a preventive war option has to
be on the basis of cost-benefit analysis (or guesswork).
6. The anticipation of high costs to prevention action
need not be a showstopper. It depends upon the value
of the stakes.
By way of conclusions, the monograph identifies
some key implications for U.S. policy and strategy.
These are drawn from the whole body of the enquiry
and, admittedly, contain a few controversial items.
1. Preemption is not controversial.
2. To wage a preventive war requires the fortitude
to withstand a great deal of criticism, foreign and
domestic. As the principal guardian of international
order, the United States needs to be willing to brave
that criticism and proceed to do what it believes needs
doing.
3. The United States does not need, and should not
talk as if it has, an explicit doctrine of prevention (not
even when it is thinly disguised as preemption).
4. The United States needs to think politically about
its resort to force and be prepared to use military power
for political purposes.
5. Preventive war requires very good, but not
perfect, intelligence. Of course, it has to be good
ix

enough to serve as a guide to action, but a demand for
immaculate intelligence could rarely, if ever, be met. It
would function as a needless showstopper.
6. Preventive war is not, and cannot be, a doctrine,
no matter what officials claim to the contrary.
7. To choose the preventive war option is to
gamble on military success, but to be well-justified in
retrospect that success will not necessarily need to be
100 percent.
8. Preventive action, for choice, should take the
form of a raid, not an invasion and occupation. The
United States should not aspire forcibly to remodel
alien societies and cultures. The issue is not one of
desirability, but rather feasibility.
9. The principal criteria for preventive action
comprise the following:
• Force must be the last resort, not temporally, but
with reference to the expected failure of other
policy instruments.
• The condition to be prevented by force has to be
judged too dangerous to tolerate.
• The benefits of preventive military action must
be expected to be far greater than the costs.
• There has to be a high probability of military
success.
There should be some multinational support, the more
the better. But, the absence of such support should not
be allowed politically to function as a veto on actions.



THE IMPLICATIONS OF PREEMPTIVE
AND PREVENTIVE WAR DOCTRINES:
A RECONSIDERATION
The United States has long maintained the option of
preemptive actions to counter a sufficient threat to our
national security. The greater the threat, the greater the
risk of inaction—and the more compelling the case for
taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even
if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the
enemy’s attack. To forestall or prevent such hostile acts
by our adversaries, the United States will, if necessary,
act preemptively.
George W. Bush, 20021
Preemption is the big new rule. It was created by 9/11.
Thomas P. M. Barnett, 20042
[N]ew world orders, as we have seen, need to be
policed.
Michael Howard, 20013

INTRODUCTION: A CONFUSED DEBATE
Rarely has a strategic policy issue generated so much
heat, yet shed so little light, as has the contemporary
debate over preemption. This ancient strategic idea is
not difficult to understand and explain, and it can be
considered in the context of more than two millennia
of historical experience. Nonetheless, the debate over
it since September 11, 2001 (9/11), would seem to have
been designed to produce maximum obfuscation.


To cite but a few of the all but willful sources of
contemporary confusion: (1) the concept of preemption
has been misused; (2) the vital character of the political
context, and of the U.S. role in it, has not been debated
realistically; (3) largely irrelevant legal and moral
issues have been given their traditional outing; and
(4) stunningly obvious arguments, typically critical of
the idea and practice of preemption and prevention,
have been advanced as if they were pearls of eternal
strategic wisdom. Six years of confusion and nonsense
is more than enough. It is the general purpose of this
monograph to remove, or at least greatly reduce, the
confusion so as to enable preemption and prevention
to be debated intelligently, competently, and in terms
that should be useful to policymakers and strategists.
We strategic theorists are guilty of failing to perform
our primary professional duty. What is that duty? Carl
von Clausewitz could hardly have been plainer: “The
primary purpose of any theory is to clarify concepts
and ideas that have become, as it were, confused and
entangled.”4 Preemption is just such an idea. In order
to attack the confusion we shall attempt to rescue
the concept, and its much more interesting partner,
prevention, from attempted intellectual control by
lawyers, moralists, narrowly military defense analysts,
scholastic political scientists, journalists, and politicians.
The dual intention here is to place preemption and
prevention where they belong in the catalog of strategic
ideas, and to relate that catalog to its political context.
In the latter regard, that means the role of the United
States with respect to the maintenance and protection
of a tolerably secure international order.
There are no new strategic ideas. In study after
study, this author has been moved to quote the
following observation by Raymond Aron: “Strategic


thought draws its inspiration each century, or rather
at each moment of history, from the problems which
events themselves pose.”5 Notwithstanding its absurd
overstatement, the quotation from Thomas Barnett
which heads this monograph is accurate in at least
one key respect: preemption as a live policy, and
hence strategic subject that certainly owes its recent
and current topicality to 9/11. It was ever thus with
regard to strategic ideas. As history moves onwards,
sideways, indeed frequently in a nonlinear fashion,
strategic thought, a la Aron’s dictum, responds, faint
but pursuing. Preemption and prevention taken
together—to be defined carefully in the next section—
have been at least contenders for “strategic concept of
the decade.” If that is felt to be too strong a statement,
one cannot deny that along with transformation,
irregular warfare, asymmetrical warfare, and the return
of counterinsurgency (COIN), they have secured a
notable place in public discourse. But, unlike those other
strategic ideas, preemption, let alone prevention, does
not have any definable military content. The concept is
a temporal one and it is preeminently strategic, where
military behavior and policy meet.
Officials and commentators, by and large innocently,
have spread confusion and invited needless debate.
In fact, much of the public debate over preemption
and prevention has been not far short of ridiculous.
To explain, one can no more debate the general
desirability or otherwise of preemption and prevention
than one can argue about the general advantages and
disadvantages of war. The subject is case specific.
War is always undesirable, unless the alternative is
anticipated to be even less desirable. What has been
remarkable has been the degree to which the literature
of the preemption debate has succeeded in wrenching


its subject out of context. Preemption and prevention
are indeed strategic ideas which can be explained and
understood in the abstract. But strategy is, above all
else, a pragmatic subject and activity. Preemption has
no inherent strategic merit or demerit, save in specific
historical contexts. Moreover, to repeat a claim that will
appear later in this monograph, preemption cannot
sensibly be debated as if it were primarily a legal or a
moral issue; it is not. Preemption is a political question
that is utterly dependent for its feasibility on military
prowess.
Although this monograph provides an overdue
reconsideration of preemption and prevention,
it is important to recognize that the recent and
contemporary debate has more to do with arguments
over the American role in the world than it does with
the alleged virtues and sins of two strategic ideas. While
our argument here will discuss preemption as strategic
theory and will endeavor to locate and explain it as
such, it must also strive to avoid a characteristic and
long-standing weakness in American strategic studies.
As befits a public and strategic culture that is more apt
to praise Clausewitz than to practice his wisdom, the
United States continues to demonstrate an uncertain
grasp of the connection between policy and military
force. This monograph will demonstrate the essential
unity of policy and the threat or use of force. Bereft
of political context, a debate over preemption or
prevention is literally meaningless.
Far from providing a mere footnote to history,
those who have spoken and debated about preemption
and prevention have sought to address matters of
the gravest significance. There is not much that can
compete in importance with decisions for war or
peace. Moreover, the preemption issue is not about


to disappear. This monograph takes a firm stand on
preemption, as it does on the all important superior
question of the U.S. role in the world, its policy, and
its strategy. But, these pages are not a contribution to
the debate over the so-called “Bush Doctrine,” which
appears to have preemption as its centrepiece.6 Still
less is it written to join the fray, belatedly, over the
advisability of the invasion of Iraq in 2003. Hindsight
is wonderful, ever the strategist’s most reliable friend.
References to Bush’s Doctrine, if such it be, to Iraq,
and even to contemporary troubles with the perennial
villains in Iran and North Korea, will be strictly for the
purpose of illustration and argument. Doctrines come
and go. After the next presidential election, the strategic
ideas of preemption and prevention may well take a
well-deserved vacation from public overexposure,
but the political and strategic contexts that yield them
their importance will certainly remain. The policy and
strategic issues of preemption and prevention are here
to stay, whether Americans like it or not. That is why
the subject of this monograph matters deeply. Clear yet
sophisticated thinking on preemption and prevention,
or the reverse, can have the profoundest significance
for international order and American security.
This monograph proceeds to: (1) explain and
differentiate the meanings of preemption and
prevention, and to place them in the recent history of
strategic thought and planning; (2) consider the legal
and cultural dimension of preemption and prevention;
(3) provide some historical context for what otherwise
could be an unduly contemporary discussion;
(4) present fairly the major arguments for and against
preemption and prevention, while not forgetting that
the exercise can have only limited utility as an abstract
undertaking; (5) develop a theory, for practice (as all


strategic theory must be), of preemption and prevention
for the 21st century; and (6) nail its colors to the mast
and specify implications for U.S. policy and strategy.
DEFINITIONS
The essential first step to clarity in debate and to
understanding the issues has to be the correct use of
key terms. It so happens, as nearly every scholarly
commentator has complained, that the so-called Bush
Doctrine of 2002 either deliberately or accidentally
misused the concept of preemption.
The President announced a new doctrine that had
preemption in the historically organizing role once
occupied by containment and deterrence.7 What is
a doctrine? Analyst M. Elaine Bunn explains: “To
call preemption a doctrine implies that it is a central
organizing principle for marshalling the instruments
of national power in support of national objectives and
that in relevant cases, action will be taken in accordance
with established governing principles.”8 This is a
suitably tough standard for a concept to reach before
it can be said to comprise the guiding light for a new
doctrine. To date, preemption falls some way short of
meeting that standard. Rather more troubling, though,
is the confusion created by official U.S. misuse of the
concept of preemption. It would be reassuring to know
that the misuse has been deliberate and calculated.
Thus far, official language and strategic behavior does
not offer such reassurance. The conceptual debate
sparked by official language and behavior has focused
exclusively on the term preemption. This concept has
been employed promiscuously to encompass any and
all cases of the first use of military force intended to
beat the enemy to the punch, even when that enemy


is nowhere near ready to throw punches. It is time to
restore discipline to the conceptual debate and thereby
end needless confusion and assist clear thinking about
policy and strategy.
Although the official, and much of the public, debate
has been content to argue about the advantages and
disadvantages of a multipurpose preemption, in fact
there are no fewer than three related concepts jostling
for recognition and proper employment. These ideas
are preemption, prevention, and precaution. There are
two underlying questions fundamental to this whole
enquiry: (1) Under what circumstances might one
strike first? and (2) On what authority might one strike
first?
If confident and reasonable answers can be provided
to these two questions, most of the confusion in the
on-going debate should dissipate. Before we answer
those questions directly, however, it is necessary to
define terms so that we know what it is that we are
talking about. Each of the three concepts introduced
immediately above, preemption, prevention, and precaution, has a distinctive temporal meaning. In terms
of extent of temporal distance from an imminent threat,
these concepts proceed logically in the following order:
precaution—prevention—preemption. The concept of
preemption has been employed so expansively that it
has wholly overwhelmed prevention and precaution
in much of the public discourse. Since the “talking
heads” and other commentators who seek to shape
public opinion are neither usually well-educated in
strategic theory, nor inclined to self-discipline in the
exact and proper use of strategic ideas, what we find
is a confused and confusing discourse on preemption.
Let us move promptly to the essential definitions.



Preemption.
Preemption refers to the first use of military force
when an enemy attack already is underway or, at the
least, is very credibly imminent. During the Cold War,
these concepts were widely understood and, in the case
of preemption, were adopted by both superpowers.
Both sides planned to launch their strategic nuclear
forces on receipt of unambiguous warning (relying on
dual phenomenology, or more) that they were under
attack. Preemption would have been a desperate
effort to disrupt, break up, and forestall a large-scale
nuclear attack.9 A preemptive strike would comprise
some combination of a launch on warning (LOW) and
a launch under attack (LUA). The alternative would
have been to launch after confirmation of attack arrival
(LAA), the option otherwise known as retaliation.
The verbal formula of the Cold War years held that to
preempt meant “to go first in the last resort.” Given the
enormity of the consequences of nuclear war almost
regardless of who went first and also given the very
tight time lines for launch decisions and safe escape
of land-based forces, it is scarcely to be wondered
that preemption was an idea, and indeed a war plan
option, that was treated with great respect. Preemptive
error today could have many dire consequences. But
preemption in the 2000s against a regional menace is
not going to end life on the planet. In the 1970s and
1980s, by way of contrast, the strategic context was
nowhere near so tolerant of possible error. In those
decades, neither superpower could afford to be lax
in its strategic conceptualization of preemption, in its
contingency planning for it, or in its decisionmaking to
choose the preemptive option.
The strategic theory, the policy, the strategy, and the
plans for the 21st century need to be radically different


from those suitable for the Cold War. But, the Cold
War era understanding of preemption should retain
its authority, even though the stakes, fortunately, are
vastly less today. To preempt is to launch an attack
against an attack that one has incontrovertible evidence
is either actually underway or has been ordered. In
such a context, the only policy and strategy question
is “Do we try to strike first in order to try to lessen
the blow, or do we receive the blow and strike back?”
Of course, the most potent military assets of some
polities may be so vulnerable to attack that if they
do not strike first, they would not even exist to strike
second. Preemption is all about self-defense. Indeed,
if we define preemption properly, which is to say as
the desperate option of last resort prior to receiving
an attack that one is absolutely certain is on its way
or all but so, it is not really controversial. The classic
statement of justification for preemption was issued
by U.S. Secretary of State Daniel Webster in 1842. He
faulted the British military initiative in attacking the
steamboat Caroline in 1837 close by Niagara Falls. The
boat was conveying men and arms to fuel a rebellion in
Upper Canada. In words that could hardly be bettered
for their plain meaning and applicability to our missile
age, Webster argued as follows:
Undoubtedly it is just, that, while it is admitted that
exceptions growing out of the great law of self-defense
do exist, those exceptions should be confined to cases
in which the necessity of that self-defence is instant,
overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no
moment of deliberation.10

Webster’s very demanding standard of imminence
of threat was modified critically by Secretary of State
Elihu Root in 1914. Root opened the gates to endless


debate when he rejected the traditional American
view of what would constitute an imminent threat,
and instead recast policy so that it would incorporate
strategic judgment. Root asserted “the right of every
sovereign state to protect itself by preventing a
condition of affairs in which it will be too late to protect
itself.”11 This is sensible, but it is no longer preemption.
In fact, what Root justifies is a policy of anticipatory
self-defense. Exercised with self-restraint and on the
basis of excellent intelligence, there is a great deal to
be said in praise of the Root formula. However, it is
no great stretch to interpret that formula as a legal,
moral, and strategic license to wage preventive wars
of discretion. Root’s use of the word “preventing” is all
important.
On the Webster definition, preemption is not
controversial. Any state finding itself either actually
under attack or unquestionably about to be so, has the
right, indeed the duty to its citizens, to defend itself as
effectively as it is able. In many, though not all, cases,
the best mode of self-defense will be a swift first strike
in an attempt to limit damage. Given the assumption
that an attack is underway, preemption is not really
arguable—save perhaps militarily—because the
aggressor has already made the decision for war. It is
ironic that the defense and foreign policy community
has been debating preemption fairly energetically for
the past 5 years and more, even though the concept
is thoroughly noncontroversial. That is what happens
when people are careless with their concepts. What
is, and has always been, controversial, is the Root
amendment to the Webster formula. Now we must
turn to the second key concept, the ever debateable
matter of prevention—of anticipatory, preventive selfdefense.
10

Prevention.
Prevention or preventive warfare is the subject that
lies at the heart of this monograph, just as it is what the
Bush Doctrine meant when it advertised the occasional
necessity for preemption. When a state preempts, it has
made a choice between the option of receiving the first
blow or striking first. The decision for war has been
taken out of its hands. Not so with prevention. If one is
uncomfortable with the tough and restrictive Webster
view of justified preemption, perhaps there can be a
strategically prudent alternative that falls short of
constituting a hunting license to wage aggressive
wars of discretion. In practice, there often is a middle
way, while in theory also one can identify guidance
for preventive war that should restrict the discretion
of fearful policymakers. However, it is the view of this
monograph that once the most restrictive meaning of
preemption is abandoned, the flood gates to potential
policy and strategy abuse are wide open. This is a case
wherein the distinction between two closely related
strategic concepts is both crystal clear and vitally
necessary. We should not tolerate without objection
public policy language that confuses preemption with
prevention.
Most major strategic concepts have at their core,
indeed depend on, an essential insight which, if
not fully appreciated, is certain to have unfortunate
consequences. For example, it is surprising to realize
that many people fail to understand that deterrence
only works if the intended deterree chooses to be
deterred. Prevention, preventive self-defense, has at
its core the proposition that the preventor, if one may
coin the term, is able to detect, and to anticipate, deadly
menace in the future. How far in the future? Since
11

there is no theory of preventive war, at least there is
none known to this theorist, we must carve our own
path through the jungle of conceptual confusion. Once
the certainty of imminent-or-actual attack is rejected
as being far too passive, and therefore imprudent, in
an era that is witnessing the proliferation of weapons
of mass destruction (WMD), strategic theory is not
able to provide much help to policy and strategy. That
is not quite true, as we shall demonstrate, because
this monograph views policy and strategy as arts,
not sciences. Unfortunately, futurology in its several
forms—astrology, advanced methods of defense
analysis, and the rest—all comes down to guesswork.12
Of course, guesses are dressed up as calculated risks,
foreseeable futures, and so forth, but former Secretary
of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld was very much in the
right ballpark when he emphasized the significance of
the unknowns and the “unknown unknowns.” For the
past several years, the Department of Defense (DoD)
has privileged the deeply Clausewitzian concept of
uncertainty in its view of the future. There has been
something of an intellectual backlash against this
recent high regard for uncertainty, but for the purposes
of this monograph, the concept fully merits its official
high standing.13
Preventive war, perhaps just a preventive strike,
can be viewed as a muscular application of Root’s
1914 dictum of prudence. But if, obedient to Root’s
precautionary logic, a state is determined to prevent “a
condition of affairs in which it will be too late to protect
itself,” how much protection should it secure through
the use of force? Rephrased, how can a doctrine of
preventive war be operationalized? Is it misleading to
regard preventive war as a fit subject for a doctrine?
We shall return to this topic in a later section. Most
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powerful strategic ideas are attended by potential
pathologies. In the case of preventive war, a leading
malady inseparable from it is a quest for absolute
security.14 After all, a policy of preventive war amounts
to an unwillingness to live with certain kinds of risk.
By preventive action, a state strikes in order to control
the dangers in its external security environment, at
least that is the intention. Some familiarity with history
reveals that the law of unintended consequences is apt
to frustrate such attempts, but since when did fearful
or overconfident policymakers permit themselves to
be deflected from a strongly favored course by caveats
derived from historical experience?
The most essential distinction between preemption
and prevention is that the former option, uniquely, is
exercised in or for a war that is certain, the timing of
which has not been chosen by the preemptor. In every
case, by definition, the option of preventive war, or of
a preventive strike, must express a guess that war, or
at least a major negative power shift, is probable in the
future. The preventor has a choice. It can elect to tolerate
the predicted adverse power shift. Alternatively, it can
function grand strategically, and endeavor by, say,
diplomatic, economic, subversive, as well as military
competitive means, to lessen the growing peril.
Obviously, temporally the more distant the danger,
the greater has to be the uncertainty. In the early 1990s,
Americans were assailed by a fashionable theory that
tomorrow’s great enemy would be superpower Japan.
Less than a decade later, the status of super threat
of the future was shared between violent Islamic
fundamentalism and China.15
To consider preventive war pragmatically, as we
must in strategic theory, we have to think in time. To
preempt is to act on the basis of certain, absolutely
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contemporary knowledge. In the sharpest of contrast,
to launch a preventive war is to act bereft of temporal
discipline. It is probably sensible to maintain that the
closer to today is the predicted maturing of danger,
the less the risk of unsound prediction. But, are any
temporal or other kinds of breakpoints suggested by
strategic theory? Does a preventive war doctrine oblige
one to consider taking forestalling military action only
against states whose capabilities (and intentions?) are
estimated to mature within, say, 10 years, or 15 years,
or when? And just how great does an estimated threat
need to be for it to warrant entry on the preventor’s hit
list?
Contrary to appearances, perhaps, this monograph
is not attempting to ridicule the notion of preventive
war. The purpose is strictly explanatory. If one endorses
the concept of prevention, there is no evading the kind
of difficulty outlined in the paragraph immediately
above. Any and every preventive war is launched
because its executors believe that it is preferable to
fight today rather than tomorrow. But, many wars
that were predicted never occurred.16 Also, many a
state or potential coalition that could pose a deadly
peril in the future failed to develop in a menacing
way. Contingency, personality, surprise, and general
uncertainty render strategic futurology a profoundly
unscientific enterprise. And the more distant the menace
in time, the greater the risk of misestimation. This is
not utterly to condemn preventive war as a strategic
concept; that would be foolish. But it is to suggest in
the strongest possible terms that, as an accepted policy
option, it is fraught with an awesome possibility of
error. And, perhaps needless to say, if a state wages
preventive war against a distinctly immature threat,
there will be no way of ever knowing whether the war
was prudent or unnecessary.
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Precautionary.
Precautionary war, our third strategic concept, is
war launched to arrest developments beyond the outer
temporal or other bounds of detectable current menace.
In other words, a precautionary war is a preventive war
waged not on the basis of any noteworthy evidence of
ill intent or dangerous capabilities, but rather because
those unwelcome phenomena might appear in the
future. A precautionary war is a war waged “just in
case,” on the basis of the principle, “better safe than
sorry.” It is war most usually located at the far end of
the timeline from preemption through prevention in
response to an ever more distantly perceived danger.
Alternatively, a precautionary war can be launched
strictly opportunistically, as an attempt to derive
maximum benefit from some more major event.
For example, had the United States proceeded from
Baghdad to Damascus in 2003, the Syrian option would
have been precautionary rather than preventive.
If two of the strategic concepts explained in this
section, prevention and precaution, are appreciated
to be perilously vague in real world application, at
least their meaning should now be plain enough.
Although it is vital to achieve strategic conceptual
clarity, theoretical neatness and transparency is only
one, albeit necessary, step towards prudent policy and
strategy. The concept of preventive war has to pass
what one can call “the Brodie test.” Bernard Brodie
wrote:
Strategic thinking, or “theory” if one prefers, is nothing if
not pragmatic. Strategy is a “how to do it” study, a guide
to accomplishing something and doing it efficiently.
As in many other branches of politics, the question
that matters in strategy is: Will the idea work? More
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important, will it be likely to work under the special
circumstances under which it will next be tested? These
circumstances are not likely to be known or knowable
much in advance of the moment of testing, though the
uncertainty is itself a factor to be reckoned with in one’s
strategic doctrine.17

The problem today is that one can clarify the
meaning of the strategic ideas, as here I hope, but that
essential task does not advance the building of the
needful theory. There is at present no strategic theory
of or for preventive war. This lack is as complete as it
is perhaps remarkable, given the all too rich historical
record of the phenomenon. A later section will seek,
carefully, to add a little useful theory to the bare
concept which is all that exists at present.
LAW AND CULTURE
Unlike the obliging certainty of the case for
preemption—one is or seen to be under attack—
preventive action is nearly always controversial.
Even if it is not controversial at the time, should it fail
militarily and therefore strategically and politically, it
is certain to be the subject of bitter debate. To wage
preventive war is to shoot on suspicion. Should the
preventive action be intended to forestall developments
that require at least several years to mature, then
the suspicion, though strong, could hardly offer a
compelling reason for war now. If the preventive war
is designed to forestall entirely a path of development
that would or could be deemed threatening, then one is
in the policy realm of precautionary offensive strategic
behavior, as explained in the previous section. In
truth, the meaning of prevention is as crystal clear as
its implications are inalienably uncertain. A preventive
16

war is a war that a state chooses to launch in order to
prevent some future danger from happening. Because
the future is by definition unknown and unknowable,
preventive action has to entail striking on the basis
of guesswork about more or less distant threats.
And threats, of course, are a matter of guesses about
capabilities times political intentions. Capabilities can
be predicted with some, one must commit only to some,
confidence, but political intentions can alter overnight.
To choose to wage a preventive war requires a state
to conduct complex cost-benefit guesswork. That
exercise is expressed politely as calculation. The state
comes to the conclusion that war now is preferable to
war tomorrow or, at the least, to an adverse shift in the
balance of power.
So far, so clear. But, how is the concept and policy
of preventive war to be operationalized? Whereas the
preemptor has only two choices, to strike first or to ride
out the enemy’s first strike and then strike back, the
potential agent of preventive war has many choices,
at least in theory. A state considering preventive war
has a choice of timing, “Should we wait?” Also, if the
state is functioning with a national security policy and
strategy worthy of being so called, the military option
will be only one of the ways in which anticipated evils
might be prevented.
Recent and indeed current history demonstrates
that when there is a whiff of preventive gunpowder in
the air, there will be no shortage of people and states
arguing for patience and delay while diplomacy does
its job—economic pressures, bribery, and the possible
benign effect of domestic change in the preventee, to
coin another term. Plainly, the less pressing the strategic
case for prompt and hopefully decisive military
behavior, the greater the nominal range of alternatives
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to war. Politicians eager to avoid war, up to a point
an understandable and meritorious determination,
will never be short of excuses, even good reasons, to
postpone hostilities. Who knows what will happen
tomorrow? The policymaker who has read his or her
Clausewitz will know that war, even preventive war,
is always a gamble, and that plans can be upset by the
independent will and behavior of the enemy as well
as by friction. Moreover, even when policymakers
have excellent reason to believe the “victory is certain”
briefings by advisors, they should understand that a
preventive war, unlike a preventive strike or raid,
may not be over when the enemy’s regular forces
are defeated.18 Witness Iraq today. A theory, let
alone a policy and strategy, of preventive war has to
accommodate the implications that there is a lot more
to war than warfare. A state and society militarily
bested in a surprise assault cannot be assumed to be
willing to cooperate with the victorious power of the
preventor.
This author holds Clausewitz’s On War in the
highest regard for its probing of the nature of war and
strategy. However, On War, though a timeless classic,
naturally reflects the political and moral context of its
time of drafting. The principal Clausewitzian dictum,
which holds that “war is merely the continuation of
policy by other means,” is both true and yet apt to
mislead today.19 War is no longer regarded as just
another tool of statecraft. Because of the appalling
strategic history of the 20th century, with its two world
wars and the longstanding menace of a third, peace
has acquired a moral and political value that it did not
have in Clausewitz’s day.20 Of course, Clausewitz’s
dictum retains its authority. War must be waged for
political reasons and in a manner that reflects the scope
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of those reasons. But, war is not “merely” one option
along with such others as, for examples, diplomacy,
economic sanctions, and political subversion. Ever since
1919 and the founding of the League of Nations in the
Treaty of Versailles, war has been morally singularized
in statecraft. Unfortunately, this rejection of politically
motivated violence has taken root only unevenly
around the world. Almost nowhere, save possibly
among the older members of the European Union
(EU), has it taken command of policy. Nonetheless,
On War, might misinform people who are considering
preventive war as a policy option.
With some good reason, one can claim that the
Charter of the United Nations (UN) provides grounds
that can justify any use of force. Superficially, the
Charter only licences self-defense, which it notes is an
inherent right. But it does not restrict what a state may
do in self-defense. The Charter, as we explain later,
is interpreted widely as not placing a state under the
obligation to receive the first blow, or to strike first
only on the basis of totally unambiguous warning that
an attack is either underway or is about to be launched.
In other words, the Charter’s recognition of the right
and duty of self-defense assuredly can be, indeed is,
interpreted as licensing a forestalling blow on the part
of the intended victim state. This is not to deny the
language of Article 51, which does appear to qualify
the inherent right of self-defense with the conditioning
phrase, “if an armed attack occurs.” But what is an
acceptable time lapse between a forestalling strike and
the anticipated aggression? Silence meets that question.
No legal authority provides an answer. If a state can
point plausibly to a truly imminent threat, it is in, or
close enough to, the legally and morally uncontentious
zone of preemption. However, the UN Charter, in effect,
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can be, and is, interpreted as tolerating preventive war.
Needless to add, perhaps, such an interpretation is
as legally sound and politically expedient as it is an
obvious violation of the plain nominal, though not
genuine political, intent of the Charter. Recall that
members of the UN are obliged to forswear the use of
force in their international relations, except, of course,
in the dire circumstances of self-defense.21
Whether or not legal, quasi-legal, and moral issues
should count for much in the U.S. debate over prevention is a matter for debate. For the moment we will
withhold judgment, being satisfied simply to register
the point that war is regarded, nearly universally, as
being a qualitatively different instrument of policy from
the rest of the tools in the grand strategy basket. This is a
fact that Americans ignore or discount at their political
peril. The singularization of war as behavior requiring
extraordinary justification is by no means strictly the
product of 1914-18. The just war doctrine of the Catholic
Church has long sought to hold Christians to a fairly
tough standard for the resort to war to be legitimate. As
we plunge into the argument over preventive war, it is
useful to bear in mind the standard six requirements
of the doctrine. Just war doctrine requires: (1) a just
cause; (2) legitimate authority; (3) right intention; (4)
proportionality; (5) likelihood of success; and (6) resort
to war only as a last resort.22 These potent criteria are
as unambiguous in their essential meaning as they are
useless as a practical guide. When is the last resort?
As much to the point, who has the right to decide?
According to the UN Charter, every sovereign state
has an inherent right of self-defense, and hence has a
duty to judge on its own behalf when is its last resort.
On the resort to war, international law is highly
permissive in practice. However, it cannot be doubted
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that, even with its permissiveness duly granted, it does
not license powerful states to wage aggressive wars
simply because they anticipate a large net benefit as
a consequence. They can always find some character
of preventive excuse. A preventive war can only be
regarded as such if it is waged for the highly plausible
specific purpose of forestalling an extraordinary
danger. If that standard is relaxed, one is back in the
culture of statecraft of the 18th and 19th centuries. In
those years wars could be, and were, waged in order to
restore a balance of power. For example, the Crimean
War of 1854-56 was waged, by Britain at least, for the
purpose of curbing the power and influence of Russia.
The France of Napoleon III, the principal instigator of
the war, was motivated by nothing more serious than
a quest for glory for a fragile regime in Paris.
To repeat, there is nothing worth debating about
preemption. If the attack is certain, there are only
two reasons for withholding the use of force. First, it
may not be feasible to preempt. If the attack is already
underway, it may be highly uncertain just what remains
in known locations of the enemy’s forces to be struck
without delay. Also, it is a distinct possibility that one’s
military instrument is not ready to preempt. It may lack
the necessary intelligence, or suitable ordnance to inflict
crippling damage. Second, it may be judged politically
and morally important to allow the enemy to fire the
first shot and thereby brand himself unquestionably as
the aggressor.23 Needless to say, the second judgment
is most unlikely to be persuasive in the face of a nuclear
attack. However, if the nuclear attack is very large,
specifically if it is from Russia, the only state other
than the United States capable of launching a nuclear
attack with many hundreds or several thousands of
warheads, it may be calculated that there would be no
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strategic advantage in preempting by way of LOW or
LUA. U.S. preemption would not be able to disrupt or
blunt an assault on such a scale.
Preventive war has a suitably ominous ring to it.
It is almost a frightening concept. By and large, only
strong states might wage it, and who or what can
restrict their freedom of policy choice? The difference in
time between the menaces targeted by preemption and
precaution may well be several years, or even longer,
but a highly risk averse great power might decide that
prompt military prevention for assured control is better
than belated efforts at forcible cure. The great or super
power as good doctor of international order could
persuade itself that timely force is effective preventive
medicine. Recall that the default justification for the
resort to war is that war has the ability to resolve
dilemmas that prove resistant to all other measures.
A generously calculated timely assault must preclude
knowledge of whether or not any of the non-military
tools of statecraft would have succeeded eventually.
We will now leave the zone of strategic theory and
abstract argument and examine briefly the historical
record of preventive war.
STRATEGIC HISTORY
At some risk of complicating matters unduly, we
must observe that history does not provide us with a
neat and convenient class of plainly preventive wars.
What one discovers on close examination is that most—
I nearly said all—wars include a preventive motive on
the part of a belligerent, and sometimes on the part of
both major belligerents. I must hasten to add that the
presence of a preventive war motive does not warrant
our classifying the subsequent hostilities as a preventive
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war. The point is that a preventive motive is likely to
be only one urge to fight among many, at least in most
cases. In order to wage a preventive war, it is not always
necessary to fire the first shot or be the first to declare
war. For example, it is not hard to sustain the argument
that for the United States, World War II, both in Europe
and in Asia-Pacific, was a preventive project. This may
seem counterfactual, not to say bizarre to some readers.
After all, did not Japan shoot first on December 7, 1941,
and did not Germany declare war on the United States
quite gratuitously on December 11? In fact, the United
States had been waging preventive economic warfare
against Imperial Japan for at least 18 months prior to
Pearl Harbor. By a progressively tighter, eventually
total blockade on oil and iron and steel, beginning
selectively in July 1940, Washington hoped to coerce
Japan into changing policy course in China, though the
most immediate issue was the Japanese intervention
in French Indo-China.24 This was a thoroughly futile
venture, since it required Japan to reverse its foreign
policy of 50 years and abandon its dream of great
power status and influence. Tokyo believed it had no
practical choice other than to fight. The point is, that
the United States acted from a powerfully preventive
motive, and it applied pressure with the economic and
financial rather than the military instrument of grand
strategy. Neither the United States nor Japan desired
war in 1941, but U.S. measures of economic blockade
left Japan with no alternative to war consistent with
its sense of national honor. The oil embargo eventually
would literally immobilize the Japanese Navy. So
Washington confronted Tokyo with the unenviable
choice between de facto complete political surrender
of its ambitions in China, or war.
With respect to Germany, a more subtle statesman
than Adolf Hitler could have sought to remain neutral
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in the Asia-Pacific War. But for reasons that are not
relevant to this monograph, he elected to join his
Japanese ally, notwithstanding Tokyo’s fairly resolute
neutrality in Germany’s struggle with the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). Although Germany
declared war on December 11, 1941, the United
States had been exercising a hugely partial variant of
neutrality for many months. U.S. warships escorted
convoys far out into the Atlantic, and they had orders
to sink U-boats on sight. In addition, the lend-lease
transaction with Britain of bases for ships and materiel
was not exactly proper behavior for a neutral state.
In 1940-41, President Roosevelt did not have the
domestic, hence the congressional, backing for war
with Germany. But he had a powerful preventive
motive for such a commitment, if and when it became
domestically feasible. The President knew that a Third
Reich victorious in Europe, possibly in possession of a
substantial fraction of the British Royal Navy, would
pose a predictably deadly menace in the long term
to the United States. We know that he was correct
to be fearful. Hitler did intend to move on from his
anticipated victory in the East to the conduct of a global
struggle with America. From an economically and
strategically secure super continental foundation in a
conquered Eurasia, Germany would have prepared
for a maritime-air conflict with the United States. Even
during World War II, Germany was pouring concrete
for a great new naval base at Trondheim in Norway on
the Atlantic.
Pearl Harbor was a political threat to Roosevelt’s
policy; because the American people wanted vengeance
against Japan, they had no particular quarrel with
Germany. Fortunately, Hitler’s rather ill-considered
declaration of war solved Roosevelt’s political problem
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for him.25 In an obvious sense, Germany compelled the
United States to wage war, though it must be said that
Hitler had shown, for him, extraordinary restraint in
1941 in tolerating unneutral U.S. activities on behalf of
Britain and then Russia. But in a less obvious sense, the
United States waged a preventive war against Germany.
It entered the conflict as early as was politically possible,
with the timing dictated by Hitler and despite a very
powerful domestic “pull of the Pacific.” U.S. policy
and strategy never wavered from commitment to the
agreed Allied principle of “Germany First” as the prime
adversary to defeat. Without Hitler’s intervention, it
would have been extremely difficult for Roosevelt to
commit the United States to the war in Europe.
If we wind the historical record back a generation to
1917, we discover an even plainer example of the United
States deciding to wage preventive war. Germany’s
announcement of its third campaign of unrestricted Uboat warfare provided the occasion, the excuse, for the
public moral outrage that permitted President Wilson
to ask for a declaration of war. However, Germany was
not threatening U.S. security in any meaningful sense in
1916 or 1917, despite some foolish meddling in Mexico
and in the United States itself with German-American
organizations. Not only was the U.S. decision for war
in no sense whatsoever preemptive, it was preventive
to the point of being arguably precautionary. In short,
the United States chose to wage a preventive war as an
Associated Power of the Allies. Wilson recognized that
a German-dominated Europe must constitute a serious
threat to U.S. national security. In its own most vital
interest, America had to prevent a German victory and
then exploit the anticipated fact of its dominant weight
and influence as having been the deciding factor in the
war in order to shape the postwar international order.
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In truth, the reasons for war are always many
and mixed. What this monograph suggests is that
considerations of prevention typically play a sometimes
greater, sometimes lesser, role. It is rare to find a conflict
wherein there is no spore of a preventive motive to
be found. With regard to the great Cold War of 194789, it is standard to cite the deadly trio of geopolitics,
ideology, and personality as combining to produce
the fatal brew which resulted in 42 years of nuclear
shadowed global menace.26 But, austerely viewed, in
1946-47 both Washington and Moscow decided to wage
preventive nonmilitary conflict. The United States was
determined to prevent the USSR from expanding its
sphere of control any further, while the USSR was
no less determined to prevent the United States from
rolling back its hard won gains.27
If we turn from great wars to lesser ones, again
focussing on the American historical record, the
evidence of preventive motivation is overwhelming.
To repeat, motives are always several, if not many,
but it is difficult to find examples of American warfare
wherein intention to prevent future trouble was not
a factor. The Civil War was waged to prevent the
destruction of the Union. The Spanish-American War
was contrived, among other reasons, in order to prevent
European colonial powers picking up the remnants
of the erstwhile Spanish Empire. America’s internal
frontier advanced from the Eastern seaboard to the
Pacific because of a long series of aggressive, in good
part preventive, wars waged against native Americans,
Frenchmen, Spaniards, and Mexicans. More recently,
the United States chose to fight in Korea in 1950 to
prevent the forcible unification of the peninsula, an
outcome believed to have dire implications in Japan
and for Stalin and Mao’s estimation of U.S. resolve.
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The U.S. decision to defend South Vietnam was a
preventive policy move. In long restrospect, the
domino theory looks better and better, when viewed in
the historical context of 1965, that is. The deployment
of U.S. combat forces to South Vietnam in 1965 was
entirely discretionary; there was no direct, or even
indirect, threat to the United States. However, it is not
difficult to discern the motive of prevention when one
applies the Thucydidean triptych of “fear, honor, and
interest,” to the U.S. policy dilemma in 1965.28
To bring the record up to date, both Afghanistan
2001 and Iraq 2003 unquestionably were preventive
wars. The Gulf War of 1991 was preventive, at least in
the sense that a powerful motive behind U.S. policy in
1990-91 was to prevent Iraq proceeding from its easy
conquest of Kuwait to the oil fields of Saudi Arabia
and the small Gulf states. Indeed, so prevalent is the
motive of prevention as a spur to war that there is
good reason to wonder if the concept retains any useful
meaning. Rigorously regarded, prevention probably
always has to be present as a motivation. When states
or other security communities fight, they have to be
motivated by an intention to prevent some undesired
condition. I do not wish to demolish the utility of the
concept of prevention, or of preventive war. However,
I must point out that far from being a rare and awful
crime against an historical norm, preventive war is,
and has always been, so common, that its occurrence
seems remarkable only to those who do not know their
history.
It follows inexorably from the analysis above that
the so-called Bush Doctrine is historically unremarkable, notwithstanding all the excitement that it occasioned in 2002-03. Of course, the historical, political,
ethical, and legal contexts have changed over the
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century, as they must. It is true to claim that to
launch a preventive war in the 21st century does
require extraordinary justification. According to one
interpretation of what passes for international law
today, such a decision needs to be justifiable with
direct respect to the needs of self-defense.29 As noted
earlier, the more distant the threat is judged to be from
maturity, the more difficult it is to provide compelling
arguments in favor of forcible preventive action. One
does not have to be a thoroughgoing cynic in order
to appreciate that the emergence of a full grown
menace most likely would be as convincing a potential
justification for preventive action as it would be too
mature to be arrested definitively: It would be too
late. If the menace in question includes the threat of
WMD, policymakers should be expected to consider
the precautionary principle that prevention is highly
desirable, or even essential, if there is no cure or
prospect of tolerable recovery.
Prevention and preventive war suffer from a near
demonic reputation that, by and large, they do not
merit. We have argued that prevention is an entirely
usual motive for war, albeit in company with other
reasons to fight. Obviously, the concept, perhaps the
principle, of preventive military action, is open to abuse.
An aggressive imperial or hegemonic power could
wage a series of wars, all for the purpose of preventing
the emergence of future challenges to its burgeoning
imperium. However, that is less than a killer argument.
Virtually every useful and necessary strategic concept
can be abused by the unscrupulous. It is a fact that
states have always waged preventive wars, or at least
have waged wars for reasons that assuredly included
prevention as a significant element. Moreover, it is a
safe prediction that they will continue to do so, despite
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evolving norms and laws that require justification in
terms of the forestalling of a very plausibly predictable
or imminent threat to national security.
DEBATING PREVENTION
Historians of the Cold War tell us that the
U.S. Government considered and rejected waging
preventive war in the late 1940s and early 1950s in
order to forestall the growth of the Soviet atomic
arsenal.30 A similar debate occurred in the early
1960s regarding the Chinese nuclear program. After
the Cold War, the United States is known to have
prepared seriously, in 1994 in particular, for the option
of striking at North Korea’s secret and illegal nuclear
facilities.31 Today, the North Korean challenge to the
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) regime remains, even
though Pyongyang uniquely has exited that regime,
while it has been joined in the cross-hairs of would-be
preventors by the Islamic Republic of Iran. The latter
has become the menace of the decade and beyond,
and, as a result, the focus of most recent and current
U.S. debate over the merit and otherwise in preventive
war.32 This monograph endeavors to avoid debating
the Iranian case specifically, because its purpose is to
provide a basis for understanding the issues associated
with preventive action in many circumstances.
Lawrence Freedman advises that “Prevention
can be seen as preemption in slow motion, more
anticipatory or forward thinking, perhaps even
looking beyond the target’s current intentions to those
that might be acquired along with greatly enhanced
capabilities.”33 That is interesting, but misleading. It
blurs what should be the clear distinction between
preemption and prevention. As this monograph has
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claimed repeatedly, there is and should be no debate
over preemption. The inherent right of self-defense
recognized by the UN Charter does not oblige a victim
or target state to receive the first blow passively. A
target state may choose to let an enemy strike first, but
that has to be strictly a pragmatic judgment.
The Bush Doctrine, so-called, declared what it
miscalled a preemptive intention to prevent the
world’s most dangerous regimes from acquiring the
world’s most dangerous weapons. This sounded like
truly muscular counterproliferation; a noble cause,
indeed. Unfortunately, or fortunately, international
and domestic politics, strategy, and military operations,
combine to provide complexities that are certain to
harass and generally threaten to frustrate the bold
counterproliferator.
It is necessary to assert the historical authority of
context. Even if the United States does have, or were to
have, a doctrine of prevention truly worthy of the title,
when and where it would be applied in action must
depend upon the specific circumstances of the case
at issue. President Bush and others have likened the
asserted doctrine of “preemption” to such dominant
guiding concepts from yesteryear as deterrence and
containment. This is both wrong and dangerously
misleading. Both deterrence and containment have the
signal virtue that they provide a prudent, relatively low
risk, default option for policy. In other words, when in
doubt, deter and contain. If one elevates preemption,
actually prevention, to the policy conceptual heights
as the default option, what is one saying? The answer
is that, when in doubt, the United States will shoot on
suspicion, taking preventive action on the grounds
that it prefers to be safe rather than sorry. To quote
the ominous prose of the National Security Strategy of
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2002, “History will judge harshly those who saw this
coming danger but failed to act.”34 To which one could
be moved to reply that there will be so many dangers
anticipated for the future, that the United States might
well find itself engaged in more wars than it can afford
or conduct effectively.
This section summarizes and presents the debate
over preventive war doctrine by means of presenting
and critiquing seven broad charges that have been
levelled and repeated all but endlessly in recent years.
These are not straw targets for easy demolition. Each has
merit, some merit at least. The purpose of this discourse
is to arm the reader with the principal questions and
concerns that will need detailed attention, and some
specific answers, in each historical case. The final two
arguments are of a more general character. The five
debating points are listed below.
1. Preventive war is an act of aggression. As such it is
both illegal and immoral. Let there be no confusion over
the practical meaning of a decision to wage preventive
war. Such a decision translates as an unprovoked attack
upon another supposedly sovereign state. Of course,
there is provocation, but it is not of the kind that carries
weight in court. The preventive warrior is provoked by
what he believes the intention of the preventee will be
at some time in the future. Some commentators seek to
provide justification by stretching the usual meaning
of preemption. It is argued that prevention is really
preemption assessed probabilistically rather than
temporally. In other words, on this line of explanation,
a preventive attack is preemptive if one is sufficiently
convinced that an attack will, or would be forthcoming.35
The author admires conceptual ingenuity, but is
unconvinced by these arguments. A mild version of the
probabilistic judgment in lieu of temporal imminence
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is a conservatively prudent adherence to what has
come to be known as “the precautionary principle” as
an approach to risk management.36 These concepts—
precautionary principle and risk management—
can serve as politically, morally, and legally, more
acceptable terms for preventive war.
Is preventive war illegal? Why is not such a war
simply a war of aggression, since it has not been
provoked by harmful behavior on the part of the target
state? The answer is that there is no international law
that truly restricts the use of force. This is not to deny
that there appears to be such law, and it is located
primarily in the UN Charter. However, all is not as
it seems. To quote the highly relevant, if somewhat
depressing, judgment of Professor David Kennedy
of the Harvard Law School, “Over the years, what
began as an effort to monopolize force has become a
constitutional regime of legitimate justifications for
warfare. There is no doubt that the Charter system of
principles has legitimated a great deal of warfare.”37
He proceeds to explain that:
The Charter came to be read as a constitutional document
articulating the legitimate justifications for warfare.
Lengthy articles and books were written parsing the
meaning of “aggression” and “intervention.” Does
economic pressure count? The conventional levers of
diplomacy—the routine arrangements of commercial
life—suddenly seemed arrayed as a continuum with
violence. At the same time, it was hard to think of a use
of force that could not be legitimated in the Charter’s
terms. It is a rare statesman who launches a war simply
to be aggressive. There is almost always something else to
be said . . .38

We have made repeated reference to what
international law, most especially in the form of the
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UN Charter, does and does not prohibit. It is time to be
more explicit. With assistance from the distinguished
legal authority, Professor Leslie C. Green, formerly
of the U.S. Naval War College, let us specify the legal
context for the resort to force.39
• The preamble to the UN Charter expresses the
determination of “the peoples of the United
Nations to save succeeding generations from
the scourge of war . . .”
• Article 1 of the Charter states that the first
purpose of the UN is “to maintain international
peace and security, and to that end: to take
effective collective measures for the prevention
and removal of threats to the peace, and in
conformity with the principles of justice and
international law, adjustment or settlement of
international disputes or situations which might
lead to a breach of the peace.”
• Article 2 (4) of the Charter obliges members
to “refrain in their international relations from
the threat or use of force against the territorial
integrity or political independence of any
state.”
• Article 51 proceeds to the heart of the matter. It
affirms the:
inherent right of individual or collective selfdefence if an armed attack occurs against a
Member of the United Nations, until the Security
Council has taken the measures necessary to
maintain international peace and security.
Measures taken in the exercise of this right of
self defence shall be immediately reported to the
Security Council and shall not in any way affect
the authority and responsibility of the Security
Council to take at any time such action as it deems
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necessary to maintain or restore international
peace and security.”

The contextualizing clause, “if an armed attack
occurs against a member of the United Nations,”
is a minor legal difficulty for the intending
preventor. But it is widely held, sensibly enough,
not to restrict the anticipated victim to passivity
prior to the assault. That would contradict the
prudent exercise of the master principle of “the
inherent right of individual or collective self
defence.”
• Chapter VII of the Charter reserves to the Security
Council authority in cases of threats to the peace
or acts of aggression “to make recommendations
or decide what measures shall be taken . . . to
maintain or restore international peace and
security.” Those measures include economic
as well as military action (Articles 41 and 42).
Of course, Security Council behavior is always
subject to potential show-stopping discipline by
the exercise of its veto power by one or more of
the five Permanent Members.
Professor Green’s excellent summary of the legal
context of our subject concludes with the flat claim that
“[i]t is clear, therefore, that the Charter does not per se
declare war to be illegal or merely criminal, but merely
a breach of treaty subject to the sanctions embodied in
that treaty.”40 Writing as a political and strategic analyst
rather than a lawyer, this author must add to Green’s
professional judgment recognition of the fact that the
UN Charter is more a political than a legal document.
Moreover, it is a “living” political document. It is a
political document in legal form. The more realistic
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among the UN’s founders were not confused on this
crucial point, but the necessary clarity has not always
been widely shared. Professional lawyers have a
culture that commits them to approach world affairs
legally. In addition, many people who simply oppose
the use of force all but reflexively, are more than happy
to seize on the presumed authority of an apolitical
and astrategic reading of Charter language to lend
legitimacy to their moral convictions.
Some people take the view that a state can only
resort to force, in other words shoot first, if the action
is strictly preemptive in self-defense, or if warfare
is licensed explicitly by a resolution of the Security
Council (UNSC). This interpretation of the Charter
is broadly rejected, first, in favor of the view that the
inherent right of self-defense does not require a state to
wait to be attacked before it can take active measures
to protect itself. Second, the UNSC does not represent
the moral authority of the global community, claims
of convenience to the contrary notwithstanding. In
practice, it is driven by the balance of influence among
five highly self-regarding Permanent Members whose
judgments on the legality of, say, U.S. strategic behavior, will have nothing much to do with considerations
of law or morality.
Overall, there is no doubt that preventive war is not
prohibited by an international law that is interpreted
intelligently. With respect to moral judgment, that
will rest upon the persuasiveness, or otherwise, of the
claims advanced for anticipatory self-defense, and,
of course, upon the interests and popular feelings
at stake in a conflict. To summarize: (1) preemption
is unquestionably legal, it is self-defense in the face
of an unfolding and self-evidently imminent threat;
(2) preventive war is legal as a forestalling move for self35

defense, but, as behavior, it is indistinguishable from
the waging of aggressive war. As Professor Kennedy
wryly suggests, aggressors always have some excuse
for their misdeeds.41
2. Preemption and prevention are only feasible if
intelligence is immaculate. Robert R. Tomes insists that
“[P]reemption, to be an effective component of national
security strategy, requires exquisite intelligence. It
requires deep insights into adversary capabilities and
interests, accurate indicators and warning, prescient
decision making capabilities, and superior battlefield
intelligence.”42
This is plausible, but overstated. It is agreeable to
have exquisite intelligence, but Tomes is in danger
of setting the standard so high that it cannot be met.
This monograph suggests, contra Tomes, that for
preemption and prevention one has to settle for
intelligence that is good enough. Good enough, that
is, to enable military force to do the job it is assigned.
With respect to preemption, although exquisite, wellnigh perfect, intelligence would be desirable, it is likely
to be the case that a lower quality of information will
suffice to enable the preemptor to achieve a seriously
disrupting effect. In fact, one could argue that given
the would-be preemptor’s choices—to strike first or to
be struck first—it almost does not matter how good is
the intelligence. One preempts as best one can with the
information available. Since it is far too late to prevent
the attack, virtually any harm that can be inflicted on
the enemy’s confidence, plans, and forces, must be
welcome.
Intelligence for preventive war, as a discrete
preventive strike, is a somewhat, though only
somewhat, different matter. The claim that preventive
military action against, for example, North Korea or
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Iran, is not practicable because the United States and its
allies lack near perfect intelligence on those countries’
WMD infrastructures, is as popular as it is fallacious.
There may be excellent reasons why preventive strikes
against North Korea and Iran would be poor ideas, but
the absence of truly “exquisite intelligence” is not one
of them. If we believe Clausewitz rather than Sun-tzu,
we know that war is a chaotic realm of uncertainty
and friction, and that intelligence habitually is flawed.
Such is the nature of warfare. The point that needs to
be emphasized is not that intelligence does not matter,
that would be absurd. Rather is the valid point to the
effect that intelligence need not be immaculate in order
to be good enough. Certainly with regard to a nuclear
program that has yet to produce operational weapons,
it does not follow that because one lacks reliable
information on every facility, a preventive strike must
fail. Fail to achieve what? A preventive strike guided by
very good, but assuredly not immaculate, intelligence,
could and should retard a nuclear program by many
years. Such an enforced delay might well be judged a
highly satisfactory military outcome. Of course, there
is far more to the issue of prevention than strictly
military considerations.
One must note in favor of this second claim
critical of preventive action, that less than immaculate
intelligence could well prove disastrous if the target
state has operational WMD, some, even just one or
two, of which escape preventive execution. The merit
in active missile defense is self-evident for such a case.
Thinking back to Imperial Germany and Grand Admiral
Tirpitz’s “Risk Fleet,” history reveals many cases
when the development of a new highly potent military
capability creates a period of unusual risk, should
the intended foreign target of the military program
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decide to prevent its completion.43 Immediately prior
to World War I, not only was Germany’s immature
High Seas Fleet potentially vulnerable to destruction
by Britain’s Royal Navy, but Russia’s “Great Program”
of railroad and army expansion presented Germany
with the certain future that, by 1917, its enemy to the
East would be more formidable.44
For a more complex example, as early as 1937 Hitler
calculated that unless he could wage and win the wars
that he needed in order to rule all of Europe by 1943 at
the latest, Germany’s enemies would have caught up
in the armaments competition. What is more, the huge
material resource advantages enjoyed by the British
and French Empires and by the USSR—discounting
the United States as a possible initial enemy—meant
that Germany only had a few years wherein the
balance of military assets would be to its advantage.45
History shows that the anticipation of major shifts in
the military dimension of the balance of power can be
periods of acute peril. Other states may well reason
“now or never.” Certainly they will consider the
argument that since war in the future is judged highly
probable, the sooner it is launched, the better.
It should be needless to add that transnational
norms about war have changed over time. In 1914,
even in 1939-41, war was accepted as an inevitable, if
regrettable, fact of international historical life. Today,
war, and preventive war in particular, is not regarded
globally as an ordinary instrument of policy. This
means that no matter how legal a preventive strike
may be held to be, to launch a war, unprovoked, is
to surrender the moral high ground. The degree to
which this would count as a factor in pre-attack policy
deliberation, must depend upon the strength of the
anxiety that is pulling the state towards exercise of the
preventive option.
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In addition to the normative violation that preventive
action represents today, the quality of intelligence on
the target state has to be ever less reliable the further into
the future one is peering. Threat equals capability times
political intention, as noted already, when the wouldbe preventor is substituting perceived probability
of danger for temporal pressure, thereby arguably
stretching the strategic domain of preemption. But
how confident can one be that intelligence on a state’s
political intentions is accurate even for today, let alone
for a period literally years in the future? Also, military
programs can founder for a host of reasons: change in
key decisionmakers, lack of resources, or a shift in the
state’s security context, to cite only a few.
It follows from this discussion that intelligence
must be ever more questionable, the further into
the future it aspires to probe. Furthermore, even
intelligence on current conditions and activities, with
a view to provision of necessary, or highly desirable,
targeting data, is certain to be imperfect. These are
high confidence generalizations. However, it does not
necessarily follow from these points skeptical of the
quality of intelligence, that as a consequence effective
preventive action is always militarily impractical.
Perfection of knowledge and of cultural understanding
are worthy goals, but they are not realistic as strict
requirements, as essential enablers, for all cases of
possible preventive warfare.
The argument here is not that we should abandon
any standard of required confidence in our intelligence.
To suggest that intelligence needs only to be good
enough does not imply a relaxed approach to the vital
subject. Rather, the purpose is to challenge the notion
that only “immaculate” or “exquisite” intelligence can
be good enough. That may or may not be true.
39

3. Prevention is not a “silver bullet,” a panacea.
Preventive war, especially a preventive strike, can be
regarded by incautious commentators who do not
respect Clausewitz as a definitive solution to a problem
that appears resistant to all other policy measures.
The dynamics of debate drive opposing positions
further apart. From being seen as a possible answer to
a pressing or even distant dilemma, advocacy of the
military option all too easily evolves from the status
of possible answer to recommendation as the solution.
It is well to remember that for prevention even to be a
live option for debate, the issue in question has to be a
most challenging one. Advocates of military prevention
may be correct in their criticism of nonmilitary options,
including long-term deterrence and containment.
However, just because deterrence is unreliable, which
it certainly is, it does not follow that a preventive strike
offers the certainty of a satisfactory alternative.46
Intelligence is bound to be imperfect. The surprise
preventive attack may not achieve surprise; friction and
ill luck may impede efficient execution of the assault
as planned; and key elements in the target set might
escape destruction or even detection. In other words,
the military option cannot offer a guarantee of complete
success, and incomplete success might amount to
failure. Preventive war, though practicable in some
cases, cannot prudently be viewed as a “silver bullet,”
as a panacea. It is not certain to be swift, decisively
victorious, and definitive in positive consequences.
Strong advocates of the preventive war option could
do worse than remind themselves of the moral axiom
that “those who live by the sword shall perish by the
sword.”
4. Preventive action, even if militarily successful,
can only be assessed properly in terms of its
consequences. The familiar axiom that there is much
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more to war than warfare alone applies with almost
spectacular accuracy to preventive action. The
preventive option, as with all other choices in statecraft
and strategy, has to be considered in terms of expected
benefits and likely costs. It is a mistake simply to
compare estimates of benefits with guesses as to
costs, because the two columns are not independent
of each other. To be specific, should the preventive
strike or war prove militarily unsatisfactory, or to
have consequences that commit one to protracted
warfare after the swift campaign, then the costs of the
preventive option will escalate way beyond the scale
of the initial calculation. There are no laws of history,
but many bold decisions for action intended to resolve
a current or anticipated threat have had consequences
that were quite unintended and even thoroughly
unanticipated.47
Because of the complexity of international relations,
it is difficult in the extreme to predict the consequences
of behavior. A prime attraction of the preventive option
is its promise of swift and decisive action to solve a
dilemma that appears likely, even certain, to be resistant
to all nonforcible means. But preventive action, even if
staged just as a raid, is apt to have costs that were not
anticipated. When debating prevention, it is essential
that the costs side of the ledger be considered, as well
as the benefits. Those costs can include loss of political
reputation, whether or not the operation is militarily
successful, since preventive warfare is always a
choice challengeable on political, strategic, legal, and
moral grounds. Even states that share the preventor’s
alarmist view of a development will worry, lest a
decision to wage preventive warfare become a habit.
Only a faint line divides prudent prevention from
an arrogant overreliance upon force. How quickly
41

does the hegemonic power draw and fire its gun? Is
it disinclined to allow much time for the other tools of
grand strategy to be effective or to demonstrate that
they cannot work? Given the invariably controversial
character of a decision to launch preventive warfare,
is the preventor, no matter how powerful, prepared
to withstand international condemnation of its all but
unilateral behavior?
There is far more to preventive warfare than just
the military action. As a major act of statecraft, forcible
preventive behavior has to be assessed beforehand
on a genuinely cost-benefit basis. And the costs have
to include political consequences, including first and
second-order effects. Above all else in importance,
though, will be the military and other consequences of
the target state’s responses to the attack. It is a besetting
sin of policymakers and strategists to neglect to take
the independent will and capabilities of the enemy
sufficiently into account. This persisting peril is never
more likely to appear than in a case where a state has
decided that a preventive strike, or war, is the solution
to its problems. Careful consideration of enemy options,
regular and irregular, military, economic, and political,
should precede, not postdate, a decision to exercise the
preventive option.
5. Preventive military action prejudges the failure
of other instruments of grand strategy. Policymakers
may be convinced that diplomacy, economic sanctions
and bribes, and political subversion will not bring the
target state to heel. But by definition, a decision for
prevention action is a decision not to allow further
time to pass wherein nonmilitary tools would be used
in an attempt to persuade, pressure, and coerce the
adversary into mending its ways. Since there is what
amounts to a global norm licensing the use of force
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only as the last resort, a decision for military prevention
unarguably must violate that standard. Recall the
rather tortured argument cited already, to the effect
that a decision for prevention allegedly can rest on the
substitution of believed high probability for temporal
immediacy. This monograph, though not unfriendly
to all cases of prevention, finds the probabilistic
defense of preventive war to be unsatisfactory. Only
a distinctly simpleminded determinist uneducated in
the role that contingency plays in history could believe
that a relatively distant danger will mature with a
probability approaching certainty. History is too rich
and complex, as well as liable to deliver one or two
of Rumsfeld’s unknowns and “unknown unknowns,”
for one to be sure, really sure, that only military action
now can prevent intolerable danger much later.48
The main trouble with this broad objection to
prevention is that it tends to be employed by those
whose principal motive is not to discipline the target
state, but rather to preclude any military action. If the
prevention school is inclined to be unduly dismissive
of the coercive and persuasive value of nonmilitary
options, so the anything-but-war school will always
try to insist that more time is needed for nonmilitary
options to work. For them, there is no last resort. In
effect, this fifth debating point comprises a clash of two
bad arguments. This study advocates that each case
of potential preventive war has to be examined on its
merits, though in the context of the points, factors, and
caveats, specified in the next two sections.
6. To wage preventive war, even to endorse
it as policy, sets a highly undesirable precedent
that encourages the resort to force in international
relations. This claim is true, up to a point at least.
Furthermore, to proclaim the necessity for preemption,
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as has the United States of recent years, is to imply that
war is not only an acceptable instrument of policy,
but that it is a fairly ordinary one. In other words, to
endorse a doctrine of preemption-meaning-prevention
is to challenge the slow and erratic, but nevertheless
genuine, growth of a global norm that regards the resort
to war as an extraordinary and even desperate measure.
A policy that favors military prevention proclaims
that it is acceptable to decide coolly and in good time
that war is preferable to the conditions predicted for
“peace.” One can try to argue that a decision to prevent
really reflects necessity, but that is not convincing. The
truth is that preventive war is a war of discretion. And
the world is full of people, not excluding many among
Western publics, who would never choose to go to war
so long as there was an alternative, virtually no matter
how humiliating that alternative might be.
Does a policy of prevention, let alone actual
preventive behavior, set a dangerous precedent? In
principle, the answer has to be “yes.” In practice, some
assert there is and needs to be a double standard.49 To
explain, it is claimed (not unreasonably in the view
of this monograph), that because the United States
has an extraordinary responsibility for maintaining
world order, it is permitted to act, indeed sometimes
it has to act, in ways that would not be acceptable if
practiced by others. The justification is international
security. As the principal guardian or sheriff of world
order, albeit admittedly self-appointed, the United
States must allow itself the policy and strategy to fulfil
its unique responsibilities.50 The taking of occasional
preventive action can be necessary if regional order
and peace with security is to be protected. Washington
should not be impressed by criticism of its preventive
war policy by those states that seek to exercise political
power without responsibility in the UN.
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No matter what international law affirms to the
contrary, all states are not sovereign equals. The
UNSC is a great power club, as was the Council of the
League of Nations before it, and as, explicitly, was the
“Concert System” that functioned usefully from time
to time between 1814 and the dismissal of German
Chancellor Otto von Bismarck in 1890. The purpose,
character, and restricted permanent membership of
the UNSC underlines the point that the maintenance of
world order can only rest on recognition of the realities
of power relations and the contemporary norms that
generally govern those relations. Given what world
order requires of the United States, or indeed of any
guardian state or institution, the claim for a special
license to use force is not only reasonable, it is essential.
If U.S. behavior should set a precedent, that would be
too bad. But it would be a price worth paying, if the
alternative had to be a world sheriff armed only with
blanks.
7. A policy that favors preventive warfare
expresses a futile quest for absolute security. It could
do so. Most controversial policies contain within them
the possibility of misuse. In the hands of a paranoid
or boundlessly ambitious political leader, prevention
could be a policy for endless warfare. However,
the American political system, with its checks and
balances, was designed explicitly for the purpose of
constraining the executive from excessive folly. Both
the Vietnam and the contemporary Iraqi experiences
reveal clearly that although the conduct of war is an
executive prerogative, in practice that authority is
disciplined by public attitudes. Clausewitz made this
point superbly with his designation of the passion, the
sentiments, of the people as a vital component of his
trinitarian theory of war.51 It is true to claim that power
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can be, and indeed is often, abused, both personally
and nationally. It is possible that a state could acquire a
taste for the apparent swift decisiveness of preventive
warfare and overuse the option. One might argue that
the easy success achieved against Taliban Afghanistan
in 2001, provided fuel for the urge to seek a similarly
rapid success against Saddam Hussein’s Iraq. In other
words, the delights of military success can be habit
forming.
On balance, claim seven is not persuasive, though
it certainly contains a germ of truth. A country with
unmatched wealth and power, unused to physical insecurity at home—notwithstanding 42 years of nuclear
danger, and a high level of gun crime—is vulnerable
to demands for policies that supposedly can restore
security. But we ought not to endorse the argument
that the United States should eschew the preventive
war option because it could lead to a futile, endless
search for absolute security. One might as well argue
that the United States should adopt a defense policy
and develop capabilities shaped strictly for homeland
security approached in a narrowly geographical sense.
Since a president might misuse a military instrument
that had a global reach, why not deny the White House
even the possibility of such misuse? In other words,
constrain policy ends by limiting policy’s military
means.
This argument has circulated for many decades
and, it must be admitted, it does have a certain
elementary logic. It is the opinion of this enquiry,
however, that the claim that a policy which includes
the preventive option might lead to a search for total
security is not at all convincing. Of course, folly in high
places is always possible, which is one of the many
reasons why popular democracy is the superior form
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of government. It would be absurd to permit the fear
of a futile and dangerous quest for absolute security
to preclude prevention as a policy option. Despite its
absurdity, this rhetorical charge against prevention is
a stock favorite among prevention’s critics. It should
be recognized and dismissed for what it is, a debating
point with little pragmatic merit. And strategy, though
not always policy, must be nothing if not pragmatic.
We turn now to the quintessentially practical realm
of strategy. The next section examines tersely the
feasibility of developing a strategic theory of preventive
war.
STRATEGIC THEORY AND PREVENTIVE WAR
I have taught strategic theory and worked as a
strategic theorist for 40 years. In all that time, up to
and including the present, I have never come across
a strategic theory of preventive war worthy of the
ascription. The political and technical feasibility of
preemption was studied endlessly during the Cold
War, with both superpowers electing to attempt it on
the basis of unambiguous warning of attack. Preventive
war was debated within government from time to time,
but, on the evidence publicly accessible today, it never
came close to acceptance as policy. As for the strategic
studies literature, the cupboard is virtually bare. There
is no strategic theory of prevention. If prevention
is regarded as a powerful strategic concept similar
in function, domain, and possibly even authority to
deterrence and containment, the absence of theory
would be hard to explain. The reality is that prevention
is not a strategic concept akin to deterrence and
containment, or to limited war or arms control. This
study asserts that there is both a lesser and a dominant
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compelling reason why strategic theorists appear to
have neglected prevention as a strategic idea.
The lesser reason why the library of working
strategic concepts is bereft of notable treatments of
preventive war is because theorists, when they thought
about the topic at all, dismissed it as being a political,
not a strategic, subject.52 Prevention does not lend
itself to the kind of rational choice analysis that has
been responsible for much of modern strategic theory;
deterrence and strategic stability are the leading
examples. It lacks a distinctive logical structure. In
short, it is not really a strategic idea at all; it is political.
The dominant reason for theorists’ apparent neglect of
preventive war is that such war lacks a distinguishable
character. Instead, it is simply war that policymakers
decide to wage by way of anticipatory self-defense,
to put a generous interpretation on the decision. In
other words, when strategic theorists try to come to intellectual grip with the concept of preventive war, they
discover that the adjective refers to matters that defy
their expertise, while the noun war already is treated
more than competently in the theories of war provided
by Carl von Clausewitz, Sun-tzu, and Thucydides.
The subject is war. When or if policymakers bank on
the potency of the adjective, preventive, they neglect
at their, and our, peril the eternal nature of war and
warfare.
So given the negative judgments just delivered,
what can be said by way of an alternative to theory for
preventive war? Whether or not a theory is possible,
and this author, to repeat, believes that it is not, what
does the defense community most need to understand
about this controversial idea? What follows is offered
as the bare bones of the functional equivalent of a
theory of preventive war.
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1. Preventive war is war, and preventive warfare is
warfare. It is not a distinctive genus of war and warfare.
The distinguishing characteristics of preventive action
are motive and timing, though the former is so wellrepresented historically that it is not especially useful as
a discriminator. Timing is by far the superior marker.
2. If preventive war is simply war, it has to follow
that it cannot require a unique strategic theory for
its understanding and guidance. It must be governed
by the same features that characterize all wars and
warfare. To understand preventive war, read and
reread Clausewitz carefully.
3. Preventive war is a gamble because war is
always such. Preventive timing and leading motive
do not negate the authority of the Clausewitzian
judgment that “[n]o other [than war] human activity is
so continuously or universally bound up with chance.
And through the element of chance, guesswork and
luck come to play a great part in war.”53
4. The state or other security entity that launches
a preventive war starts with an advantage. It has
selected the timing for combat, and it has the initiative.
However, those advantages diminish should the
war be other than a single campaign. All attacks lose
momentum over time, and many adversaries are able
to rally, regroup, and counterattack in various ways. It
is not usually safe to assume that the victim-preventee
will be a helpless target set. Furthermore, even if a
preventive regular character of war achieves rapid
victory, it has been fairly common in history for that
victory to be marred by “the war after the war.” At the
core of Clausewitz’s trinitarian theory of war was his
insistence upon the universal salience of the complex
and highly variable relations among passion or hatred,
chance, and reason. A state’s army may be beaten, but
its public might not accept that verdict.
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5. When considering preventive military action,
the assessment must include anticipated and possible
costs, as well as expected benefits. Policymakers, in
common with the rest of us, are ever vulnerable to the
censoring effect of their desires and convictions.
6. A prudent anticipation of high costs should
not necessarily be a showstopper for proposals for
preventive war. Cost-free, casualty-free warfare is a
fantasy. This is not to deny that Kosovo in 1999 was
a casualty-free enterprise for NATO. However, that
remarkable historical episode was the exception that
proves the rule. If the case for prevention is believed
to be compelling, even the certainty of daunting costs
of many kinds cannot be permitted to close down the
option from live consideration. Each historical case has
to be examined on its own terms at the time. There are
no metrics, there is no methodology, to which one can
delegate the decision to act or not to act.
These six points, and the body of enquiry behind
them, enables this monograph to specify some key
implications for U.S. policy and strategy. It may be
necessary to emphasize that some of these implications
express the personal beliefs of the author. Although
the claims and recommendations are historically and
analytically grounded, there is no denying that in a
few cases they are controversial. So be it.
KEY IMPLICATIONS OF THE CONCEPTS
OF PREEMPTION AND PREVENTION
FOR POLICY AND STRATEGY
1. Preemption is not controversial. It is not always
feasible or effective, but its inherent desirability cannot
be challenged.
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2. To be willing to act preventively requires a
determination to proceed in the teeth of much, even
great, political opposition. The United States has to be
willing to strike preventively, very, very, occasionally.
3. The United States should not have, indeed
does not need, an explicit doctrine, so miscalled, of
prevention (or preemption, meaning prevention). Its
global role as principal guardian of world order requires
it to maintain the capability to behave preventively,
and to be willing to use it.
4. In order to approach the preventive war option
prudently, the United States has to accept the necessity
for using military force for political ends.
5. To wage preventive warfare successfully
requires very good intelligence, as does warfare of any
character. It does not require immaculate intelligence.
A requirement for the best is the enemy of the good
enough.
6. Military prevention is not, and cannot be, a
doctrine, let alone the national security doctrine. It
should be regarded as “an occasional stratagem,”
certainly not “as the operational concept of choice.”54 To
go to war, even just to stage a very limited campaign, is
to enter the realm of chance, risk, uncertainty, friction,
and potentially exorbitant costs. Deterrence is infinitely
preferable, if and when it can work.
7. To endorse the prevention option is to be
willing to gamble on military success. In some cases,
the damage required to be inflicted must be close to 100
percent (e.g., if nuclear-armed missiles are the prime
targets).55 But in other instances military perfection
would not be necessary in order for the strike or
campaign to achieve worthwhile strategic and political
goals.
8. In most cases, preventive military action should
have the character of a raid, not an invasion. Strategists
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should be pragmatic. At issue is not the desirability
of conquest, enforced regime change, and societal
remodelling, but rather their feasibility and costs. A
swamp-draining motive behind the preventive option
is simply not sustainable. It must meet with a fatal level
of political opposition at home in the United States as
well as abroad, it is not affordable, and—last but not
least—it is not doable. The United States is not capable
of remaking culturally alien societies so that they
become shining examples of successful American style
globalization. And if the job is impracticable, it cannot
be sound policy and strategy to make the attempt.
9. Since this monograph endorses prevention as a
rare, but still vitally necessary, option, it judges these
to be the most essential criteria for a decision to act:
• Force must be the last resort, not temporally, but
with respect to the evidence-based conviction
that the nonmilitary instruments of policy
cannot succeed.
• There must be persuasive arguments to the effect
that the conditions to be forcibly prevented
would be too dangerous to tolerate.
• The benefits of preventive military action must
be expected to be far greater than the costs.
• There must be a high probability of military
success. The U.S. preventor would be risking its
invaluable reputation, after all.
• There should be some multinational support
for the preventive action; indeed the more, the
better. However, the absence of blessing by
the world community cannot be permitted to
function politically as a veto.
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Because of this author’s strong agreement with the
judgment expressed, these words of John Lewis Gaddis
will close this enquiry:
Like most other nations, we got to where we are
by means that we cannot today, in their entirety,
comfortably endorse. Comfort alone, however, cannot
be the criterion by which a nation shapes its strategy and
secures its safety. The means of confronting danger do
not disqualify themselves from consideration solely on
the basis of the uneasiness they produce.56
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